In an asset market where agents have heterogeneous information, asset prices not only depend their expectations of the true fundamentals but also depend on their expectations of the expectations of others. Iterations of such expectations lead to the so-called "infinite regress" problem, which makes the analysis of asset pricing under heterogenous information challenging. In this paper, we solve the infinite-regress problem in a simple economic setting under a fairly general information structure. This allows us to examine how different forms of information heterogeneity impacts the behavior of asset prices, their return dynamics, trading volume as well as agents' welfare. We find that in general current prices exhibit long-range dependence on past shocks. Moreover, we show that information heterogeneity tends to lower the level of asset prices, increase price volatility and return variability, and reduce trading volume. It also tends to decrease agents' welfare, including those with superior information. * Qiu is from MIT Sloan School of Management and Wang is from MIT Sloan School of Management, CAFR and NBER.
Introduction
The impact of information asymmetry has long been of key interest in the study of financial markets. 1
Investors' private information is impounded into asset prices through their trades, and prices will then reflect the average beliefs cross investors. As a result, investors not only care about the fundamental values of a security, but also pay attention to other investors' beliefs on the fundamental value, a situation which Keynes (1936) refers to as the "Beauty Contest." Since private beliefs or their averages are not observable either, beliefs of beliefs and their higher iterations also matter. Capturing these higher order beliefs, especially in an intertemporal setting, makes the formal analysis of the market behavior under asymmetric information a challenging task, which is also known as the infinite regress problem. 2 Most of the existing work focuses on situations in which the dimensionality of the problem can be reduced to be finite, either by limiting the dimension of underlying shocks or the form of information asymmetry. 3 In this paper, we consider a model which allows for general forms of information heterogeneity and directly solves the infinite regress problem and the resulting market equilibrium. This allows us to examine in detail how different forms of information heterogeneity affects the behavior of asset prices, trading activity and investor welfare.
We show that the infinite-regress problem yields the long-range history dependence of the current market behavior. In general, current asset prices and their dynamics depend on the whole history of past shocks. In particular, revelations of past underlying shocks can influence current prices more than concurrent shocks. Information heterogeneity increases the divergence in investors' beliefs about economic fundamentals. Such a divergence tends to reduce the amount of risk sharing among investors and their effective risk tolerance. Consequently, stock prices become lower and more volatile.
In addition, information heterogeneity reduces the level of liquidity and consequently the amount of trading in the market. We further show that the effect of information heterogeneity is non-monotonic in the amount of private information agents have. It is maximized when agents receive moderate amount of private information.
Moreover, we show that information heterogeneity tends to reduce investors' welfare. In particular, investors are typically worse off by possessing private information-they can be made better off by either revealing or abandoning all their private information collectively. We also find that investors with superior information does not necessarily enjoy higher welfare. The adverse selection problem makes it very costly for them to trade with less informed investors for risk sharing. Such a cost can out weight the potential gain they make from speculating on their private information.
We consider a continuous-time model in which fundamentals of the economy change stochastically over time. The economy is populated by long-lived agents receiving both endowment shocks and private information about the fundamentals. They trade competitively in a security market to share their endowment risks and to speculate on the future movements of security prices with their private information. The risk-sharing trading motive allows us to avoid the introduction of noise traders, which is necessary in examining the welfare implications of information heterogeneity. The information structure we consider is quite general-different agents can receive different private signals about the underlying shocks of the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. In Section 3, we present the equilibrium of the economy. Section 4 considers the special case of homogeneous information, which serves as a benchmark in analyzing the impact of information heterogeneity. In Sections 5 and 6, we consider how information heterogeneity influences asset prices, return dynamics and agents' welfare. We first consider in Section 5 a particular form of information heterogeneity in which agents have diffuse private information on the fundamentals of the economy and examine its impact on the market behavior. We then extend our analysis to the other forms of information heterogeneity. Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
The Economy
We consider a pure exchange economy with a single, perishable consumption good.
Securities Market
There is a competitive securities market with two traded securities, a risk-free bond and a risky stock. The bond yields a constant return of r > 0. The stock pays a cumulative dividend D t , which is given by
where {B t : 0 < t < ∞} is a n-dimensional Brownian motion, b D is an (1 × n) constant vector and M t follows a mean reversion process
with b M being a constant vector and a M > 0 a constant. We will use σ D and σ M to denote the length of the vector b D and b M , respectively. Similar notation will be used later for other processes.
Agents
The economy is populated by a continuum set of agents, denoted by A. The measure of A is normalized to be one. The set A consists of subsets A i , i ∈ I, and
For convenience, we also use I to denote the total number of subsets when appropriate. Agents in each subset A i are assumed to be identical. We use m i to denote the measure of set A i .
Each agent i ∈ A i (i ∈ I) is initially endowed with one unit of the stock. In addition, he receives a non-traded cumulative income of G i t at time t, given by
where N t is a one-dimensional Brownian motion, Y t and Z i t follow standard O-U processes, respectively. In particular,
with a Y and a i Z being positive constants, b F , b Y and b i Z being constant vectors of proper order, and B i Z,t a one-dimensional Brownian motion independent of B t . The instantaneous income flow for agent i is (Y t + Z i t )dN t at time t. Thus, Y t dN t represents the common component of the income flow and Z i t dN t gives the idiosyncratic component. Since dN t characterizes the random shock to the agents' non-traded income, Y t and Z i t define the common and idiosyncratic exposure to risk in their non-traded income, respectively. Summing up all agents' non-traded cash flow we have
Information Structure
The underlying state of the aggregate economy is given by three variables, D t , M t and Y t . In general, agents do not have perfect information on the underlying state of the economy. Instead, they have private information on some of these state variables. Below we consider a rich information structure in which agents receive a mixture of public and private information.
Each agent i ∈ A i (i ∈ I) observes market prices of traded assets, in particular the stock price P t and its dividend D t . He also observes his total exposure to the non-traded income risk,
In addition, he receives a signal S i t on M t , given as follows
where b i S is a constant and B i S,t is a one dimensional Brownian motion. Moreover, we assume that public announcements reveal the aggregate state of the economy with a lag of T . In other words, M t−T and Y t−T will be know to all agents at time t.
Let F i t denote the information set of agent i at time t. We have
where ∨ represents the union of two information sets.
For expositional convenience, we use the following convention: If ||b i S || 2 = ∞, then agents receive no signal S i t . Thus, by our definition for ||b i S || 2 = ∞, we have
Preferences
Each agent i ∈ A i has a time-separable, constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility over his life time consumption. Let c t denotes his consumption rate at t, α > 0 his risk aversion and ρ > 0 his time discount coefficient. Agents choose their consumption and trading policies to maximize the expected utility of the form
CARA preferences also requires the following condition on the non-traded income to guarantee that agents' lifetime expected utility is finite:
Simplifications
For notational convenience, we let 
Z,t and B i S,t (for each i ∈ A) are mutually independent. 5 Except when explicitly stated otherwise, we will consider the case when I = A, i.e., when there is a large number of agent groups. Then we have
Thus, the aggregate exposure to the non-traded risk depends only on Y t . In this case, the underlying state of the economy is fully determined by D t , M t and Y t .
Discussions
The information structure defined above is fairly general. It contains situations considered in the literature as special cases but extends to more general situations. Although our solution will be given for the general information structure, our analysis will focus on several simple cases in order to develop the intuition on the effects of different aspects of information heterogeneity. These simple cases are listed below.
A. Homogeneous Information
Homogeneous information refers to the case where all agents have the same information. This is achieved in our setting by letting
Identical private signals across all agents are equivalent to a public signal. The quality of the signal then determines the total amount of information the agents have. In order to examine how the amount of information in the economy affects its behavior, we consider two extreme cases.
First, suppose that σ S = 0, i.e., the public signal is exact. 
Second, suppose that σ S = ∞, i.e., the public signal is completely uninformative. This is the case where agents have no information on the fundamental of the stock, in particular M t , other than what is revealed by realized dividends. The market price of the stock, which will only depend on Y t , in effect fully reveals it to the market. We refer to this as the case of No Information, which is given by
It should be clear that agents have more information in the full information case than in the no information case. Thus, comparing the equilibrium in these two cases allows us to gauge the impact of the amount of information in the market, as opposed to the difference in information between agents.
B. Diffuse Information
Diffuse information refers to the situation in which agents receive different private information, with comparable but independent noise. In other words, the overall information is diffusely distributed among all agents, without abnormal concentration. We can further assume perfect symmetry between
For the behavior of the aggregate market, such a symmetry between agents is not essential. It merely simplifies the exposition.
The case of diffuse information was considered by Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) in static settings and by He and Wang (1995) and Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) in finite horizon, discrete time settings. Discrete time and finite horizon allow the state space to be limited to finite dimensions and thus avoid the "infinite regress" problem. Our continuous-time setting does not limit the dimension of the state space and allows us to solve the "infinite regress" problem and examine its implications.
C. Asymmetric Information
The case of asymmetric information allows for more concentrated private information among different agents. Analyzing such a situation allows us to examine how concentrated private information, as opposed to diffused private information, influences market behavior. Such a situation is best considered in our setting when there are only finite number of groups of investors, i.e., I is a finite set.
The case of hierarchic information (where I = 2 and σ S is zero for one of the two groups) was considered by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) in a static setting and by Wang (1993) in a dynamics setting. The asymmetric information case with two groups is considered by Makarov and Rytchkov (2007) under the additional assumption that agents behave myopically and have the same information precision. In this paper, we study in detail the simple case where there are two groups (i.e. I = 2) under the general information structure and without the myopic assumption.
In our model, in addition to heterogenous information, we also explicitly model agents' allocational trades, i.e., trades from motives unrelated to private information. We do so by introducing non-traded income shocks, as in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) and Wang (1994) . These income shocks give rise to trading needs for risk sharing. Endogenizing the allocational trades rather than inserting them as exogenous noise allows us to further examine the impact of information on welfare.
Market Equilibrium
For the economy defined above, we now consider the solution to its equilibrium. Given the Gaussian nature of the underlying state variables and the CARA preference, we are interested in linear equilibria in which the stock price is a linear function of past shocks. In particular, we have the following result:
Proposition 1. In a linear stationary equilibrium, the stock price process is of the form:
where h P (·) is a (1 × 4) vector of deterministic functions.
In the various special cases examined in the literature (e.g., Wang (1993 Wang ( , 1994 , He and Wang (1995) and Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) ), the equilibrium is shown to take such a linear form in the underlying shocks. The general case we consider here makes an substantial extension: It allows an infinite number of state variables. As evident from (16), the price may depend on the the whole path of past shocks. In continuous time, this implies that the state space is infinite-dimensional. Such a large state space is necessary to capture the nature of the so-called "infinite regress" problem that arises under general heterogenous information.
The full solution for the general case is provided in the Appendix. To simplify exposition, in this section we only present the solution in the case of diffuse information with symmetric parameters as described in Section 2 (Case C). It captures the basic nature of the equilibrium under heterogenous information and the intuition behind it.
In the diffuse information case, shocks to the idiosyncratic endowment Z i t and the noise of the individual signal are independent. As evident from (16), they will not appear in the stock price function due to the Law of Large Numbers. Consequently, the stock price should only depend on the past shocks of aggregate variables:
In the remainder of this section, we outline the key steps in obtaining the solution to the equilibrium as described in Proposition 1 (details can be found in the Appendix for the general solution). 
Filtering Problem
where a X and b X can be easily constructed from (1), (2), (5), and (7). Note that symmetry among the agents implies that a X and b X are the same for all i.
Applying the Non-Markovian Filtering technique, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Assume that the stock price is given by the form in (16) . Let
Then, under filtration F i t , (i) the stock price can be expressed as
whereB i s is a 6-dimensional Brownian motion with respect to F i t ;
(ii) the dynamics ofX i t is given by
Optimization
Under the price process (16), we can express the instantaneous excess return on the stock as
Conditioning on the information of agent i, we can re-express the excess stock return as
Let c i t denote agent i's consumption rate at t and x i t his holdings of the stock. His wealth evolves according to the following process:
where dQ t is given in (22 
where V i t is an Ito process with respect to F i , given by (ii) his optimal stock holding x i t is given by
where
The optimal stock holding x i t given by equation (25) (see, Merton (1971) ). The sign of this term is determined by the instantaneous correlation between the stock return and the value process.
Market Clearing
From Theorem 2, we know that the optimal stock holding of agent i is of the form
Moreover, we can re-write the optimal stock holding as a linear combination of shocks under the objective information set. The following lemma formalizes this idea:
Lemma 1. The optimal stock holding of agent i is of the form:
By the Law of Large Numbers, we have the following market clearing condition:
Theorem 3. The market clears if and only if
Therefore the market clear condition in Theorem 3 gives a well-identified system for h P (s),
and p 0 (for a formal statement of equilibrium condition, see the Appendix). Its solution describes an equilibrium of the economy in the form of Proposition 1.
In the following sections, we will examine how information heterogeneity impacts the stock price behavior and investors' welfare.
Special Case: Homogeneous Information
We first consider the special case of homogeneous information. This case serves as a benchmark in our analysis of the impact of heterogeneous information on market behavior.
We define the expected future dividends of the stock, discounted at the risk-free rate, by
For simplicity, we will refer to F t as the "fundamental value" of the stock. The actual price of the stock in general differs from its fundamental value for two reasons. First, agents may not observe F t but have to rely on their own information to form expectations, which can be different from the true value of F t . Second, realized dividends can be different from their expected value and a corresponding risk premium will arise in equilibrium. Our analysis will focus on these two components.
As stated in Section 2, under homogeneous information we have
is given in (13). Thus, all agents have the same forecast about future dividends, which is determined by M t . In particular,
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Theorem 4. Under homogeneous information, in equilibrium, (i) the stock price P t is given by
(ii) the optimal stock holding of agent i is
and his value function is
12 ; φ
12 , φ
2 ) and φ (0) are constant matrices. Moreover, φ From (28), we see that the equilibrium stock price has two components. The first component is the expected future dividends discounted at the risk-free rate, i.e., the "fundamental value" of the stock. The second component gives the risk discount in the stock price, arising from the risk in its future dividends.
The risk discount consists of two terms. The constant term, p 0 , gives the unconditional risk discount. The stochastic term, h Y Y t , arises from the aggregate exposure to the non-traded risk Y t . Since the non-traded risk is positively correlated with the risk of the stock (i.e., σ DN > 0), an increase in the non-traded risk, i.e., an increase in Y t , will cause an increase in agents' overall risk.
As a result, they want to sell the stock to reduce their overall risk exposure. This gives rise to their (static) hedging demand for the stock. In equilibrium, a decrease in aggregate stock demand causes a decrease in the stock price, which is linear in Y t .
We also note that the stochastic nature of Y t further leads to agents' dynamic hedging need.
Especially, changes in Y t lead to time variation in the expected returns on the stock. The agents' desire to hedge the changes in their investment opportunities will further modify their stock demand, both on average and over time as Y t varies. This dynamic hedging demand also influences the equilibrium price. 6 In particular, the term (
12 in p 0 and ασ 2 Y φ 11 in the denominator of h Y come from the dynamic hedging effect. If agents were behave myopically, i.e., they choose policies to maximize the expected utility over future wealth, which is equivalent to having an effective value function of −e −ρt−αW t , then we will have φ
When agents behave dynamically, they adopt policies to maximize the expected utility over future consumption, in particular to smooth the time variation in their value function.
From (31), it is obvious that with φ This dynamic hedging motive gives to the negative term in the denominator of h Y in (29), making it larger than its value under myopic behavior.
We now can give a clear interpretation of the unconditional risk discount p 0 . It is proportional to α, agent's risk aversion. The first term,σ 2 F simply gives the perceived risk in the stock's fundamental value. The second term, h 2 Y σ 2 Y , gives the additional price risk due to the time-variation of the aggregate non-traded risk. The third term comes from the additional decrease in stock demand due to its changing expected returns.
Clearly, the third term arises from agents' dynamic hedging needs. In addition, dynamic hedging also increases h Y (φ (2) 11 > 0), which increases the price variation in response to changes in Y t and consequently p 0 . Thus, we can conclude that agents' need to dynamically hedge the risk in Y t tends to increase the unconditional risk discount of the stock. Moreover, we can also consider the stock price volatility, which is given by
Obviously, dynamic hedging causes the stock price volatility to increase too as it leads to a higher
Next, we look at agents' equilibrium stock holdings as given in (30), which depend only on their heterogenous shocks; common shocks such as Y t only shift prices. In the absence of private information, the only source of heterogeneity comes from agents' exposure to non-traded risks, which is given by Z i t . Indeed, as stated in (30), their equilibrium stock holding is linear in Z i t . The proportionality coefficient h xZ gives the optimal response of stock holdings to one unit increase in idiosyncratic non-traded risk. In particular, an increase in idiosyncratic non-traded risk causes an agent to reduce his stock holding. Trading among agents, however, has no price impact since idiosyncratic shocks are washed out in the aggregate.
In the case of homogenous information, all agents have the same information. But the total amount of information they have can vary, depending on the amount of noise in the common signal S t , which is measured by the volatility of noise σ S . As σ S increases, the common signal becomes noisier and agents have less information about the future dividends of the stock. A natural question is how does the total amount of information in the market affect the market equilibrium, in particular, market prices and welfare? We have the following result: We first note that when σ S increases, agents have less information about the fundamentals of the stock. In particular,σ 2 F increases and the stock becomes riskier. This implies that as an instrument to hedge against non-traded risk, the stock becomes less desirable. Thus, agents will be less aggressive in using it to hedge the dynamic risk, especially the risk in Y t and Z i t , and their value function becomes more sensitive to the time variation of the two state variables, especially, higher values for 1 both lead to higher risk discount p 0 . Less information influences the stock price volatility in two ways. First, it reduces the variability in agents' expectation of the fundamental, i.e.,M t , which tends to decrease price volatility. The reason is simple. Expectations only change with new and quality information. Second, h Y increases, as discussed above, which tends to increase price volatility. Under homogeneous information, we can show that the first effect dominates.
The Impact of Information Heterogeneity: The Case of Diffuse Information
We now analyze how the presence of heterogenous information affects the market equilibrium. In this section, we consider the case of diffuse private information as described in Section 2, Part B.
In particular, we will examine how private information affects the behavior of asset prices, trading activity and agents' welfare. We return in Section 6 to consider how our results extend to the cases with other forms of heterogenous information.
For notational convenience, we define the expectation operator E i t and the average expectation operatorĒ t as follows:
(33)
Information Heterogeneity
There are two aspects of a given information structures: (i) the amount of information available to investors and (ii) the difference in information among different investors. Information amount available to an investor is determined by the precision of his private signal and by the information content of public signals. One can measure the amount of information an investor has about an underlying state variable of the economy by his forecasting error about that variable. More precisely, for each investor i ∈ A, we define his forecasting error for the underlying state variables to be 
When information is heterogenous, the stock price does not fully reveal the aggregate income shock Y t . Therefore their total non-traded income shock Y t + Z i t will be informationally valuable. This will contribute to the degree of information heterogeneity. In the discussion below, we will hold constant the information provided by non-traded income shocks and focus on the information provided by investors' signals on M t , the stock's fundamentals (i.e., its cash flows).
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the normalized forecasting error about M t against the precision of private signals. The results are very intuitive. The forecasting error is zero in the full information case (σ S = 0) and is largest in the no information case (σ S → ∞). The error increases as the private signals become noisier. The right panel of Figure 1 provides the same plot for the normalized forecasting error about Y t . It is interesting to note that it not monotonic in the precision of investors' private signals (about M ). In the two extreme cases, i.e., full information and no information, investor can precisely infer Y t from the stock price, which contains little information about M t . However, for moderate precisions of private signals, the informational inefficiency about Y t peaks. When investors receive different private signals about fundamentals, they will have different expectations about future stock payoffs. The stock price aggregates these expectations and investors extract useful information about fundamentals and about other investors' expectations. We can quantify the degree of information heterogeneity using the average of the difference between the perceived M t of each agent and the average perceived M t :
When investors only use their private signals and ignore the information revealed by the stock price, the degree of information heterogeneity will exhibit a hump-shape against the signal precision.
If the precision of private signals is high, investors have highly accurate estimate of the fundamental and the difference between investors' estimates will be small. If the precision of private signals is very poor, without using stock prices as an additional source of information, investors' forecasts of
and the degree of information heterogeneity also becomes small.
When investors use both private signals and public signals to forecast fundamentals, the relation between the information heterogeneity and signal precision could still be hump-shaped. 
Stock Price
We now examine the the impact of information heterogeneity on market equilibrium, in particular, the stock price. From Equation (17) and the unconditional variance of the stock price. According to Equation (17), the stock price can be written as:
Apparently, the price at time depends on the history of shocks to the economy, in particular, D, M and Y . In the linear equilibrium we are considering, this dependence is fully described by the coefficients with respect to these shocks, i.e., h P D , h P M and h P Y . Thus, in studying the behavior of the stock price we first focus on these coefficients.
In Figure 3 , we plot h DM (τ ), h P M (τ ) and h P Y (τ ) as a function of τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ T ). The solid line describes the case of diffuse information. For comparison, we have also plotted the two extreme cases of homogeneous information, the case of full information in dashed line and the case of no information in dash-dotted line. We examine these three coefficients separately, which reveals the impact of information heterogeneity on the stock price.
Clearly, h DY = 0 in the case of full information. This is obvious. When investors observe M , which determines the stock's future cash flows, it fully determines the stock's fundamental; past 7 We can also define a measure of information heterogeneity for state variable Yt. It exhibits a similar behavior as δ. The behavior of h P M is more interesting, which is shown in the middle panel of Figure 3 . Under full information, the stock price depends linearly on M t and
Obviously, it is positive and decreasing in τ . Under full information, in addition to dividends, investors rely on stock prices to learn about M t . However, in this case, stock price contain no information about M t . As a result, we have h P M = 0. Under diffuse information, prices become informative about M t . In particular, investors rely on the whole path of past prices to make inferences about M t . In general, positive shocks to M lead to higher private signals about M and consequently higher prices. That is, h P M is positive. What is striking is that the impact of past shocks to M does not necessarily diminish.
In fact, for the parameter values in Figure 3 , h P M (τ ) actually increases with τ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ T . This implies that shocks to the stock's fundamental in the distant past can have significant influence on the current stock price, more so than the shocks in the recent past. This behavior is qualitatively dif-ferent from that under homogeneous information. As we will see later, this implies that information heterogeneity can lead to distinctively different stock price dynamics.
We now turn to h P Y , which is plotted in right panel of Figure 3 . As expected, we have h P Y (τ ) ≤ 0, for reasons discussed in the case of homogeneous information. Its magnitude decreases with τ , as expected. However, comparing the values of h P Y for different degrees of information structure leads to surprising results. In particular, the absolute value of h P Y is significantly higher than those under full information and no information. In other words, information heterogeneity substantially increases in the impact of non-traded risk exposure, i.e., Y t , on the stock price. This result arises in part because in the presence of heterogeneous information investors trade less aggressively to share risk. Poor risk-sharing leads to a larger price impact from the aggregate risk exposure. 8
Given the overall properties of the price function, we now examine the impact of information heterogeneity on the properties of the stock price. We first consider the level of price discount p 0 , which is given by
whereb Q is given in Equation (22) and v 1 (0) is given in Theorem 2. Proportional to the risk aversion coefficient α, the price discount consists of premia associated with two risks: (i) the total amount of perceived risk for the stock return,b QbQ , and (ii) the total amount of perceived risk for dynamic changing of investment opportunities, 1 rb Q v 1 (0) . The impact of information heterogeneity on the two components of price discount level can be understood as follows. In the presence of information heterogeneity, the sensitivity of price to the aggregate income shocks is magnified. The stock return reacts more to the income shocks and the perceived return volatile increases. Investors then demand higher risk premium and p 0 rises. Furthermore, as discussed before, the amplification effect on the impact of Y t due to the information heterogeneity reinforces the amplification effect on the impact of Y t due to the dynamic hedging effect. This further increases the sensitivity of the price of the aggregate income shocks, which in turn further increase the both the perceived risk of stock return and the perceived risk of the changes of investment opportunities. Risk premium increases. The two effects reinforce each other. Overall, p 0 increases as the degree of information heterogeneity increases.
Figure 4 confirms this intuition. As σ S increases, the amount of information available in the market decreases, which increases the perceived risk about the fundamental of the stock and consequently its price discount. On the other hand, when σ S is small, as σ S increases, the degree of information heterogeneity also increases (see Figure 2) . Thus, the effect of heterogeneity increases, which increases the impact of non-traded risk on the stock price (i.e., |h P Y |) and consequently the price variability and discount. These two effects work in the same direction and the price discount as measured by p 0 increases. When σ S is large, an increase in σ S still reduces the amount of information amount but reduces the degree of information heterogeneity. Therefore, the effect of information amount and the effect of information heterogeneity work in the opposite directions. In the example shown in Figure 4 , the price discount decreases for when σ S is large. This leads to a hump-shaped curve of p 0 against σ S . It is important to note that in this case, the value of p 0 is outside the range given by its value under homogeneous information. In particular, its value under diffuse information can be significantly higher than those under both full information and no information. This clearly shows that here it is information heterogeneity that can substantially increase the risk discount on the stock. We now turn to the stock price' volatility, which is determined by its response to shocks to the three aggregate state variables: D t , M t , and Y t . From Figure 3 , we see that as the noise of investors' private signals σ S increases, the amount of information about the stock's fundamental decreases. They have less information about the true M t and rely more on realized dividends to make inferences. As a result, h P M decreases while h P D decreases. As we have seen from Theorem 5, this has the net effect of reducing the volatility of price as it becomes less reflective of changes in the fundamental. We have also seen that the reduction in the amount of information investors lead to larger impact of shocks to the non-traded risk Y t , due to investors' dynamic hedging needs. This effect is shown in Figure 3 , by the difference in h P Y between the two cases of homogenous information, full information and no information. Although this effect tends to increase price volatility, in magnitude it is overwhelmed by the direct effect of information amount, as Theorem 5 clearly states. The effect of information heterogeneity, however, completely changes this picture. As Figure 3 clearly shows, the magnitude of h P Y increases significantly for reasons discussed earlier, which can lead to much higher price volatility.
The right panel of Figure 4 plots the stock price volatility against the precision of private signal σ S .
When the private signal becomes noisy (i.e., σ S increases from zero), the amount of information in the market decreases, which tends to lower price volatility. But information heterogeneity increases when σ S is small, which tends to increase price volatility. These two effect offset each other and the overall effect can go ether way. For the case shown in Figure 4 , the impact of information heterogeneity dominates for small σ S . The stock price volatility becomes higher under diffuse information than that under full full information, especially when the degree of information heterogeneity is high.
As σ S becomes large, all private signals become less informative and the information heterogeneity diminishes. The effect of information amount then dominates and price volatility becomes decreasing in σ S and finally approaches a lower level given by the case of no information. The fact that price volatility can move outside the range defined by the two homogeneous cases unambiguously demonstrates that it is caused by information heterogeneity, not the amount of information.
The inverted U-shape in both p 0 and SD [P ] clearly shows that information heterogeneity can potentially help to explain average stock returns and price volatility.
Price Dynamics
In this section, we discuss the impact of information heterogeneity on price and return dynamics.
When investors have heterogeneous information about asset fundamentals, asset prices are affected by the average beliefs of the agents about the fundamentals. Therefore, they need to forecast the average beliefs of other investors as well as how the average beliefs evolve over time. These forecasts will be based on all the information they have received in the past. As a result, the equilibrium asset price becomes dependent on the whole history of the economy, which can lead to interesting forecasting relationships. In stead of examine how information heterogeneity can influence price dynamics in general, we focus on specific examples to illustrate its potential importance.
We first explore the link between future price changes and past changes in fundamentals. In particular, we consider the following regression
which regresses current price changes on changes in the fundamental with lag τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ T ). 9 It is 9 Under the diffuse information case, the current state variable Mt may not be directly observable to investors. But important to note that this is not a regression an investor can run in real time since changes in M with lag τ ≤ T is not observable to him. But it can be run using historic data containing realizations of P and M . 10 As we see below, results from such a regression reveals important information about the underlying structure of the economy. Figure 5 plots the regression coefficient a 1 (τ ) against the time lag τ . When investors have full information about the asset fundamentals, the regression coefficient a 1 is negative and the magnitude decays as the prediction time horizon τ increases. A current positive shock to M will lead to a higher future value of M . One the other hand, the mean reversion of M implies that the price change is negatively related with past changes in M . Therefore, a current positive shock to M will lead to a negative future price change and the regression coefficient a 1 is thus negative for the full information case. The magnitude of the coefficient a 1 also decays due to the mean-reverting nature of M . The current shock to M t will have smaller and smaller impact on future levels of M when the future time horizon increases (we can show that the coefficient a 1 decays exponentially as the time lag τ increases). When investors have no information, a 1 (τ ) remains negative, for the same reason as in the case of full information. Its magnitude is no longer monotonically decreasing in τ , increasing with τ when τ is small but then decreasing when τ is sufficiently large. When investors have heterogeneous information, the coefficient a 1 (τ ) exhibits interesting patterns. First, it becomes significantly positive for a wide range of τ . A positive shock to current fundamental M could lead to a positive expectation of future price changes. Second, a 1 (τ ) is not since all information will be revealed after a time lag T , investors will know all the history about M until time t − T . Therefore, from the perspective of an econometrician, performing such regressions is feasible using historical data. monotonic as the time lag τ increases. Figure 5 shows that as τ increases, the magnitude of the coefficient a 1 (τ ) decreases first and then increases. This implies that the current shock to M may have a larger impact on the price change on a more distant future than on the near future. Third, when the time lag τ is greater than the information revelation lag T , the coefficient a 1 converges to that of the full information case, which is negative. This is quite intuitive since after the revelation, M becomes public knowledge and should have the same impact on the future price as in the full information case. This pattern of a 1 (τ ) is very much consistent with the shape of the price function, especially the coefficient h P M (τ ), which links the stock price to past shocks to the fundamental and can be an increasing function of τ , at least for a wide range of τ . This suggests that qualitative differences in the relationship between current price changes and past fundamental shocks may exist which allow us to identify the importance of information heterogeneity in the market.
Another important aspect of the price dynamics is the autocorrelation of returns. For a time horizon h, we define the excess stock return as:
and we consider the autocorrelation of the excess return: Corr[Q t,t+h , Q t−h,t ]. It turns out that in the
case of large number of investors, such as the case we consider here, the excess return autocorrelation exhibits a simple behavior. In particular, when information is homogeneous, the autocorrelation of the excess return Corr[Q t,t+h , Q t−h,t ] is positive for any horizon h if the aggregate non-traded income Y t is persistent (when a Y < r), and is negative for any horizon h if the aggregate non-traded income Y t is not persistent (when a Y > r). In addition, the information heterogeneity will not change the sign of Corr[Q t:t+τ , Q t−τ :t ]. However, it will enhance the magnitude of these autocorrelations. In later part of this paper, we will discuss in more detail the impact of information asymmetry on return auto-correlations.
Trading Activity
Next we analyze how information heterogeneity affects investors' trading activities. For investor i, we use the instantaneous volatility of his stock holding, dx i t , as a measure of his trading activity. The total trading activity in the market is then given by
where V ar [·] denotes the variance of a random variable.
In our model, investors trade to share their non-traded risk and to speculate on their private information. When information is homogeneous, only the first trading motive is present. Trading is only influenced by the amount of information available to the investors. Theorem 5 shows that a reduction of the amount of information will lower the trading volume because the perceived stock return becomes more volatile and the stock becomes less attractive as an hedging instrument to share risk. Thus, the optimal stock holding will be less sensitive to investors' idiosyncratic income shocks and trading activity decreases. as information heterogeneity increases. However, from our previous discussion, information heterogeneity also substantially increases stock price volatility (see Figure 4) . This increases the risk of speculation and hence deters speculative trading. As it turns, this risk effect plays a dominate role in investors' trading behavior. Figure 6 plots the trading activity against σ S . Clearly, under diffuse information, trading activity drops below its range under homogeneous information. It is minimized when information heterogeneity and price volatility reach their peaks.
Welfare
An important feature of our model is that stock trading is endogenized, which allows us to examine the welfare implications of information heterogeneity. Welfare can be defined through the certainty equivalence of the value function. More precisely, an investor's welfareV is defined as:
where J 0 is his value function at t = 0. J 0 depends on the investor's initial bond and stock holdings.
To make meaningful comparisons, we assume that the initial bond holdings are the same for all investors, and the initial stock holdings are also the same cross investors. The worsening in risk sharing leads to substantial drop in welfare. Figure 7 illustrates this point in the case of diffuse information. Welfare of each investor decreases at first when σ S increase from zero, when both the effect of information amount and information heterogeneity work in the same direction (the information amount decreases and the degree of information heterogeneity increases in the case). The welfare reaches a minimum for some intermediate value of σ S and then start to increase as σ S further increases. This U-shaped welfare function against the signal precision is consistent with the observation that while the information amount always decrease as σ S increases, the degree of information heterogeneity in fact first increases and then decreases when σ S becomes large. 11
One implication is of particular interest from Figure 7 . When private signals are noisy enough, 11 Dow and Rahi (1971) studies the impact of information asymmetry on welfare in a static set-up. They also show that the welfare could exhibit a U-shaped pattern against the signal precision. However, in their model, an increase of information amount can lead to a reduction of the risk-sharing opportunity and hence the Hirshleifer effect is present. The U-shaped curve in their model is a result of the offsetting effects of the less risk sharing opportunities due to the earlier resolution of uncertainty from the better information and a better hedging instrument due to the less risky stock return from the better information.
the welfare loss associated with information heterogeneity could be so large that it would be better off for all agents just to discard completely their private signal. In deed, the welfare in the heterogeneous information case falls below the welfare in the no information case when precision of signals is small enough, and the no information case Pareto dominates the heterogenous information case.
General Forms of Information Heterogeneity
In the case discussed in the previous section, we considered a particular form of information heterogeneity, that is when information is diversely distributed among a large number of investors. In this case, we consider other forms of information heterogeneity and how they influence asset prices and market behavior. In particular, we will consider the situation where information is concentrated among a few groups of investors (Section 2). For simplicity, we allow two groups of investors, i.e. I = {1, 2}. To focus on the impact of information heterogeneity, unless stated otherwise explicitly, we assume that the two groups have the same population weight, i.e., m 1 = m 2 , their income shocks are uncorrelated, i.e. Y ≡ 0, and the idiosyncratic income shocks have the same distributions, i.e.
To help organize our analysis, we consider three simple cases. The first case has a hierarchic information structure, where one group observes M t perfectly (σ 2 S = 0) and the other group observe a noisy signal about M t (σ 1 S > 0). This case, which we denote as Case 1, has been studied by many authors in various settings, e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Wang (1993) . Hierarchical information represents an extreme form degree of information asymmetry. The second case is when the two groups of investors have signals of the same quality, i.e., σ 1 S = σ 2 S . In other words, neither group has an information advantage. This case, denoted as Case 2, has been studied by Makarov and Rytchkov (2007) . The third case, which we refer to as Case 3, allows general signal qualities for the two groups of investors, i.e., σ 1 S and σ 2 S can take arbitrary values. In this case, the group of investors with more precise signals have certain information advantage over the other group, but advantage is absolute-the nosier signal still contains information in addition to their own.
Pricing Implications of Information Heterogeneity
In Figure 8 , we plot the measure of information heterogeneity δ in the three cases we consider. The left panel is for the case of hierarchic information when group-2 investors are fully informed about M t .
As the noise of group-1 investors' signals increase, i.e., when σ 1 S increases, information heterogeneity also increases, monotonically from zero to an asymptotic level. This is expected. It is worth noting that the asymptotic level is below 0.5, reflecting the fact that equilibrium price reveals information We now examine how information heterogeneity affects the stock price in the three cases. The intuition that under heterogeneous information investors trade less to share risk and the price impact of non-traded risk is amplified still holds. As a result, the magnitude of the risk discount on the stock price p 0 and its volatility SD[P ] tend to increase with information heterogeneity.
The top left panel of Figure 9 shows that in the case of hierarchic information, p 0 monotonically increases with σ 1 S , together with information heterogeneity, which is shown in Figure 8 . The level of p 0 exceeds its value under no information when σ 1 S is significantly different from zero and the information asymmetry between the two groups of investors is nontrivial. This result is intuitive.
Under asymmetric information, adverse selection problems the less informed investors face deters them from trading with the better informed investors for risk sharing. The additional non-traded risk investors have to bear makes the stock, whose risk is positively correlated, less attractive, yielding a lower price, i.e., a high discount. Also, the reduced risk sharing increases the impact of non-traded risk on the stock price, making it more volatile. This is shown in the bottom left panel of Figure 9 .
SD[P
We note that under hierarchic information, the value of p 0 can significantly exceed its value under no information. This result is different from those obtained in Wang (1993) , in which the value of p 0 is bounded from above by its value under no information. This difference arises from the fact that in our model, trades for risk sharing are endogenous, driven by shocks to investors' non-traded risk while in Wang (1993) they are exogenously specified as shocks to the supply of the stock. Exogenous supply shocks do not capture the additional loss from risk sharing between more and less informed investors and its influence on price.
Next, we consider Case 2 when the two groups of investors have signals of the same quality
. This case is similar to the case of diffuse information as the top and bottom middle panels of Figure 9 confirm. Finally, we consider the more general case when the two groups of investors have private signals of finite but different precisions. As the top and bottom right panels of Figure 9 show, the situation is more complex. With σ 2 S = 1, when σ 1 S is small, group-1 investors have much more precise signals than group-2 investors and we are close to the case of hierarchic information.
Both the price discount p 0 and price volatility are higher than the cases of full information and no information. However, when σ 1 S is comparable to or larger than σ 2 S , we are in a situation that is close to Case 2.
Price Impact and Trading Volume
When investors have signals of different precision, their trades tend to impact the stock price differently. In particular, for investors with better signals, shocks to their non-traded income tend to have a larger impact on prices. This occurs because when they trade for risk-sharing reasons, their counterparties, i.e., investors with worse signals, will perceive higher risk in the stock, especially the risk of adverse selection for trading against better information. As a result, more price concessions are required to attract the worse informed investors to participate in the trades.
The left panel of Figure 10 shows the price impact of the two groups of investors' income shocks in the case of hierarchic information. The solid line plots h P Z (0)/h xZ (0) for group-2 investors, who have perfectly informative signals (σ 2 S = 0), against σ 1 S , the noise in group-1 investors' signals. Note that h i P Z (0) measures how group-i's current income shock Z i t affects the stock price and h i xZ (0) measures how it affects their stock holdings. The ratio of the two gives the price impact per unit of group-i's trades. The dashed line plots that for group-1 investors, who only have noisy signals. It is clear that the trades of better informed investors have much larger price impact than the worse informed investors. When the better informed investor makes a selling hedging trade, the price will fall. But the less informed investor will partially interpret the price fall as a bad news for fundamentals and they will also tend to make selling trades based on this perception. The price then falls further. Therefore, the information advantage of the better informed investor is in deed a double-edged sword. On one hand, better information allow him to better trade against the less informed investor and get positive informational rent. On the other hand, he will find himself harder to hedge against his non-traded income shocks since his hedging trade will have a larger price impact.
We can further examine how private information affects the amount of trading under different forms of information heterogeneity. In the right panel of Figure 10 , we show how trading activity varies with the precision of group-1 investors private signals in the three cases considered here. In Case 1 with hierarchic information, trading activity monotonically decreases as group-1 investors' becomes noisier. This is intuitive: As group-1 investors become more disadvantageous, they become less willing to trade in the market. In Case 2 with same quality of information for both groups of 
.5, and m 1 = m 2 = 0.5.
investors, trading activity is minimized when the information heterogeneity is maximized (around
6.3 Welfare Figure 11 plots the welfare of both agents as a function of σ 1 S , in three cases. There are several interesting observations from the graphs. First, in Case 1 when group-2 investors have superior information, their welfare is actually below those of group-1 investors who have less information. This seemingly counter-intuitive result is a consequence of the higher price impact of more informed investors' risk-sharing trades. The more informed investor has greater difficulty in hedging his nontraded income due to more price concessions they have to make. The resulting welfare loss out-weighs the gain from their speculative trading on superior information. Second, in Case 2 when the private signals of the two agents have the same precision, the investors' welfare is U -shaped against the signal precision. In particular, their welfare can be even lower than that in the no information case. This is consistent with the intuition that an increase in the degree of information heterogeneity will lead to a welfare loss. Third, in Case 3, when both groups of investors have private signals, both their welfare may end up below the level under no information. In addition, the group with more precise signals tends to have lower welfare. 
Conclusion
This paper studies the asset pricing and welfare impact of information asymmetry. We propose a simple setting with a rich set of information structure and solve for equilibrium with the presence of the infinite regress problem.
We focus on the impact of information heterogeneity on asset prices and trading activities. We find that information heterogeneity tends to increase the level of price discount, increase the stock price variance, and decrease the trading activity. In particular, we show that the presence of private information and the imperfect information investors have about aggregate versus idiosyncratic risk shocks hinders investors ability to share risk. Poor risk sharing leads to larger price impact of shocks unrelated to asset's cash flows, which leads to lower price and higher price volatility.
The welfare impact of information heterogeneity is particularly interesting. Information heterogeneity could lead to a welfare loss due to less risk sharing. Moreover the welfare loss associated with information heterogeneity could be so large that it would be better off for all agents if they discard their private information about fundamentals and only use public information, even though their private information is valuable to forecast the fundamentals. In other words, information heterogeneity is socially costly. Finally, when there is differentiation among investors' signal precision, high information quality could be a double-edged sword for the better informed investors. On one hand, better informed investors could have informational rent when trading with less informed traders.
On the other hand, the risk sharing trades of better informed investors will have a larger price impact and investors with better information will find themselves in a difficult position to hedge their non-traded income shocks, which will make them worse off.
APPENDIX

A Non-Markovian Filtering
In this appendix, we study a general non-Markovian filtering problem. Let (Σ, F, P ) be a probability space and {B t } +∞ t=−∞ be a standard m-dimension Brownian motion with standard augmented filtration {F t } +∞ t=−∞ . X t is a m-dimensional adapted process with the following dynamics:
where µ X is a m × m constant matrix, and σ X is a m × m non-degenerate constant matrix.
Assume T > 0 is a fixed number and S t is a n-dimensional (n < m) adapted process w.r.t.
{F t }
+∞ t=−∞ with the following dynamics:
where h S (z)(for 0 ≤ z ≤ T ) is a n × m matrix-valued functions and g S is a n × m constant matrix. 12
LetF t be the filtration generated by S t and X t−T , i.e. 13
Define the filtered state vector:
(A.1)
Before we state the main theorem in this section, we need to define a few constants first. First
Let I n be the identity matrix of dimension n. Then I n − b is symmetric and admits the following
where k is a rank(I n − b) × n matrix with full row rank. Also define
Now we state the main result of this section.
12 It is easily seen that St is an Ito Process if hS(T ) = gSbX . We will assume this equation throughout this section.
13 We use F Y to denote the filtration generated by a process Y . 
In the rest of the section, we sketch the proof to the theorem above.
Lemma A.1. (a). The process S t can be written as an Ito form:
dS t = µ St dt + h S (0)b X dB t , where µ St = t t−Tḣ S (t − v)dB v + g S µ X X t−T .
(b). Fixed initial time T 0 , define the process
Proof. Part (a) is a direct consequence Ito's lemma. Using the Law of iterated expectations,we can 
(A.7)
Proof. Equation (A.7) gives only a heuristical definition. More rigorously, let {{t A.8) where N is the largest integers smaller than (t − T 0 )/∆t (n) − 1, and ∆B t
One can prove that as n → +∞, the sequence of processes {η n } 
And let G B (s) (s ∈ [0, T ]) to be the solution to the following integral equation:
We now are in the position to state one of the key results of this section. 
where Λ S (u) and Λ B (u) (u ∈ [0, T ]) are given by
14 More rigorously, we should specify the initial data η S T 0 and η B T 0 and the initial σ-algebra at time T 0 . But if T 0 is negative enough, this will not affect the resulting filtration.
Then the processeŝ
The proof is a straightforward computation, using the fact that all the processes are Gaussian (for a reference, see Liptster and Shiryaev (2004) ). A detailed proof is available upon request.
To get the filtered process for a general process with T -lag-revelation, we notice that X t−T isF t measurable, notF t−T measurable. So we need to decompose X t−T into the sum of aF t−T measurable part and theF t−T -orthogonal part. The following lemma gives the decomposition result.
Lemma A.3. We can decompose X t−T as
where {X t } is filtered state vector given by (A.1), andĥ XS (·) andĥ XB (·) are defined as:
Proof. SinceX t−T is orthogonal to {dB s } t s=t−T , the coefficients in (A.14) are given (heuristically) by:ĥ
The result of the lemma then follows.
The following is then straightforward.
Lemma A.4. The dynamic os S t under {F t } ∞ t=−∞ is given by
whereĥ SS (·),ĥ SB (·) are given by:
The above lemma gives the proof of Part (b) of the main result Theorem A.1.
The following lemma will prove the Part (a) of Theorem A.1. 
We can compute the dynamic of {X} using the standard Kalman filetring method. Notice
The second term now can be computed using standard linear projection.
B A General Optimization Theorem
In this section, we solve a general optimization problem with non-Markovian price process. The agent has exponential utility over consumption stream {c t } ∞ t=0 , with time discount ρ. In particular, the agent solves: A.20) and the wealth of the agent evolves according to:
where x t is the number of stock that agent i holds at time t,Θ t is the income process, dQ t is the excess return and dF t is the value of a unit income at time t.
LetB t be the Browian motions of the agent's filtration, and assume
We state one of the main result of this section. 
The process V t follows:
where V t , µ V,t , and b V,t satisfy the Bellman equation:
(ii) The optimal consumption c t is
(iii) The optimal stock holding x t is .27) .
Proof. Let −Ĵ t denote the value function, then
NormalizeĴ t : let
The exponential nature of utility suggests that the value function can be written as:
where V t does not contains w t . And for general purpose, write
where dŵ t does not contain w t .
Using these specifications, we have
Bellman equation is now
First order condition for c gives:
And the Bellman equations becomes:
Now under the specification of dŵ t :
we have
Re-write in terms of polynomial of x, 0 = min
First order condition for x t implies
The first term is the myopic demand, the second term is the hedging demand.
Plug it back into the Bellman equation, we get
This complete the proof.
C Optimization Problem of Agent i
In this section, we study the optimization problem of agent i, given below
s.t. dw
Now we state the key linearity assumptions about Θ i t , dQ t , and dF t . Assume: 
. (a). The process V t is a Ito process with respect to {F
where µ V,t and b V,t are given by Proof. The proposition follows from direct computation using Lemma C.1 and the equation (A.23) in Theorem B.1. S1-S6, and the boundary condition B1-B3, give a complete system for v 11 (·, ·), v 12 (·), v 22 , v 1 (·), v 2 , and v 0 . Below we outline how to solve this system using a fixed point method.
Step 0: Set an initial guess of the value of v 12 (0).
Step 1: Given v 12 (0), use B1 to get the value of v 11 (0, T ). Then use this value of v 11 (0, T ) and S1
to solve for the function v 11 (0, x)( notice that S1 can be reduced to a delayed integral equation about Step 2: Use the value of v 12 (0) and v 11 (0, x) from Step 1, and S2, to solve for the function v 12 (x) (notice that S2 is a linear ODE for v 12 (x)).
Step 3 
In this
Step, we get the true value of v 12 (0), v 22 , v 11 (0, x), and v 12 (x).
Step 4: Use v 11 (0, x) obtained in Step 3, and S1, to solve for v 11 (x, y) (notice that the function v 11 (x, y) is completely determined by the value of v 11 (0, x)).
Step 5: Guess an initial guess of v 1 (0).
Step 6: Use the guessed value v 1 (0), the function v 11 (0, x) obtained in Step 3, and S4, to solve for the function v 1 (x) (note that S4 gives an ODE for v 1 (x)). Also use v 1 (0) and S5 to solve for v 2 (S5 is a linear equation for v 2 ).
Step 7: Use the v 1 (x) obtained in Step 6 to get v 1 (T ). Notice both v 1 (T ) and v 2 in Step 6 are completely determined by the guess of v 1 (0). We then use B3 to get an equation on v 1 (0). Solve for v 1 (0) using this equation. Use this true value of v 1 (0) to get the true function v 1 (x) and true value of v 2 from Step 6. Finally use S6 to obtained v 0 .
D Proof of Theorem 4 and 5
Since information is homogeneous among agents, price is fulling revealing for Y t . LetM t = E[M t |F t ], whereF t is the information available to agent at time t.
D.1 Investors' Filtering Problem
We first consider the investor's filtering problem. 
D.2 Optimization
Under the price process:
for some constants p 0 and h P Y , the excess return process is given by
We can decompose the volatility of return into two component: Standard argument (see Wang (1993) ) yields that the value function will be of the form
where Φ 2 , Φ 1 , and Φ 0 are constant matrices of the proper order. The optimal stock holding is
We denote Φ 2 and Φ 1 as:
D.3 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Market clearing implies that the optimal stock holding is of the form 
